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Abstract 
In 2013 the governments of the Netherlands and Scotland established national police forces, 
replacing a tradition of largely autonomous regional police organisations.  In both 
jurisdictions, these radical reforms have raised concerns about the consequences of these 
national police structures for local policing and for relationships with local communities and 
local government.  Drawing on documentary sources and interview material from each 
jurisdiction and informed by insights from the policy implementation literature, the key 
question addressed in this paper is how has the legislation that created the new national police 
forces been put into effect at a local level?  Focusing on the impact on the governance, 
organisation and delivery of local policing, the paper reveals how the implementation in both 
jurisdictions involves interpretation and discretion by multiple actors so that gaps are 
emerging between the national ‘policy promises’ set out in the legislation and the ‘policy 
products’ experienced in local contexts. 
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Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, the organisational structures of many police forces in Western and 
Northern European countries have been reconfigured, shifting from largely decentralized and 
often fragmented systems to become more centralized, national arrangements. In countries as 
diverse as Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Scotland, and Sweden, the underlying 
drivers of these changes have been similar.  These include promoting effectiveness and 
efficiency, improving the response to transnational crime, and enhancing the power of 
national governments over the police (Fyfe, Terpstra & Tops, 2013; Van Sluis et al., 2013). 
One of the most important issues in the public debate about these reforms concerns the 
consequences of centralized, national police structures for local policing and for relationships 
with local communities and local government. In some countries, such as Scotland, Denmark 
and Norway,  supporters of reform have claimed that a national police force can enhance local 
policing (by, for example, improving local access to specialist expertise and resources) while 
critics have highlighted the risk of negative impacts such as the erosion of local democratic 
oversight and a loss of local knowledge among officers  (see Scott, 2013; Holmberg and 
Balvig, 2013; Holmerg, 2014).  In this paper we elaborate on the consequences of centralizing 
police reforms for local policing and the relations with local authorities by focusing on the 
implementation of national police organisations in Scotland and the Netherlands.  We 
concentrate on these two countries because both have had a long tradition of decentralised 
policing arrangements comprising regional police forces and a strong focus on local policing 
and  local police governance arrangements.  In  early 2013, however, each country made a 
radical transition from a regionalized police system to a single, national force. There were 
different drivers of these reforms in each jurisdiction ( in Scotland the main focus was on the 
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financial savings while in the Netherlands  concerns centred on improvements in the control 
and management ('beheer') of the police) but in both jurisdictions the claim was made by 
national governments that the new police system would not have negative consequences for 
local policing.   By adopting a cross-national comparative perspective we are able to analyse 
how these seemingly similar structural reforms to police organisations which came into force 
within 3 months of each other are being implemented and experienced in different ways.  This 
comparative approach therefore offers the opportunity to distill the specificities of particular 
political and organisational contexts in shaping the structure, governance and delivery of 
policing.    
 
Against this background, this paper critically examines the local dimensions of the police 
reform in the Netherlands and Scotland.  Given that the research on which the paper is based 
was conducted largely during the first year after each of the national police forces was 
formally established, the main focus is on implementation rather than on evaluation.  
Furthermore, the approach taken in this paper is essentially inductive, providing a 'thick 
description' of the implementation process but using this to exemplify themes in the wider 
literature on implementation research (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Hupe, 2014). The key questions we 
address are  how, why and with what consequences  has the legislation that created the new 
national police forces been put into effect at a local level ?  This is important because, as 
Barrett and Fudge (1981: 9) observe, ‘policy does not implement itself’ and policy 
implementation is rarely a rational or linear process.  Rather, there are multiple actors 
involved, often with different interpretations of central policy objectives and with varying 
degrees of discretion (Schofield, 2001) which creates scope for an implementation ‘gap’ or 
'deficit' to emerge between policy objectives contained within legislation and practice at street 
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level (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Ham & Hill, 1986).  Implementation may also be a 
'process of strategic interaction among numerous special interests all pursuing their own 
goals' (Bardach, 1978: 9). As a result the implementation may be confronted with delay, 
resistance, symbolic implementation, but also create the room for learning, bargaining and 
negotiations or the creation of coalitions supporting the policy mandate (Lane, 1987; Hill, 
1997).   This capacity of actors to modify policy in the process of implementation is what we 
explore here by focusing on the impact of the police reform legislation on the local 
governance of policing and the organisation and delivery of local police services.   
 
The account draws on both documentary sources and interview material from each 
jurisdiction.  The documentary sources include the plans produced by both government and 
police in preparing for reform, the legislation which established the new policing 
arrangements, official reports of  Parliamentary debates about police reform, and initial 
assessments of the implementation of  reform produced by oversight bodies, such as police 
inspectorates and audit organisations.  In each country 15 interviews were carried out with 
key actors, including local police commanders and representatives of local authorities (in the 
Netherlands mayors and municipal officers; in Scotland local councillors and officers of the 
council)  in rural and urban areas. This involved a process of  purposive sampling and while 
no claim can be made for the representativeness of the overall group interviewed, the range of 
people who participated does provide insights from different perspectives and contexts.  The 
interviews were conducted between October 2013 and June 2014  and so focus on the 
implementation process during the first 10 to 18 months of the national forces.   
 
To set this documentary and interview material in context, we begin with a short description 
of the two police reforms, and the treatment of local policing in the legislation that introduced 
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the national police organisations into the Netherlands and Scotland.  The second half of the 
paper then focuses on how the process of implementation has impacted on the governance, 
organisation and delivery of local policing.  It reveals how the implementation in both 
jurisdictions is far more complex than a linear  ‘top-down’ process but involves interpretation 
and discretion by multiple actors so that gaps are beginning to merge between the national  
‘policy promises’ set out in the legislation and the ‘policy products’ experienced in local 
contexts.      
 
The contexts and contours of police reform legislation  
 
Contexts of reform 
There are some significant similarities between the Netherlands and Scotland in terms of the  
background to the 2013 police reforms (see too Terpstra and Fyfe, 2014)..  In both countries, 
policing had previously been delivered by relatively autonomous regional forces (numbering 
25 in the Netherlands and 8  in Scotland ) and both countries had well-established  traditions 
of local policing. In the Netherlands this was exemplified by the way in which before 1993 
each municipality with more than 25.000 inhabitants had its own police force and in the other 
small and rural municipalities the former Royal Police Force had a very strong local basis 
with a network of police stations in the small villages. After the 1993 police reform the main 
organizational principle for the Dutch police became ‘decentralized, unless...’, an indication of 
the continued stress on the importance of local policing.  In Scotland policing had always 
been a local municipal public service, closely tied to the arrangements for local government.  
Although the number of local forces had gradually declined as a result of mergers from over 
40 in 1950 to just 8 by 1974, the key connection between local police forces and local 
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government remained.   Local governance of policing was exercised by elected councillors 
with local government providing half the costs of policing and being involved in the 
appointment of local chief officers.    Policing was therefore viewed  as an ‘integral part of 
local public service provision’ (Donnelly & Scott, 2010b: 458; Donnelly, 2010).  
Nevertheless, despite a strong focus on local policing, both countries had witnessed a gradual 
process of centralization in  police decision-making over the last 20 to 30 years.  In Scotland 
this was evident in the increasingly important role played by ACPOS (Association of Chief 
Police Officers in Scotland)  in formulating national policies, and the role of the Scottish 
Government in establishing national bodies such as the Scottish Police Services Authority 
(SPSA) in 2007 and the Scottish Policing Board in 2010 to address national strategic police 
priorities in areas like information technology, forensics and training (Donnelly & Scott, 
2010a: 105-106; Fyfe & Scott, 2013).  In the Netherlands the process of creeping 
centralization resulted from a combination of a strong political desire to have  tighter control 
on the police forces and an increasing reliance on stricter forms of accountability (Terpstra, 
2004; Cachet & Sey, 2013).  
 
Despite the gradual processes of centralization in both countries, the decisions that led to  
establishing the national police forces in 2013  were taken remarkably quickly.  In the 
Netherlands, although there had been some earlier unsuccessful proposals for a national 
police, the year  2010  proved to be a turning point, partly as a result of the loss of the 
dominant position of the Ministry of the Interior (that traditionally had a close relationship 
with local governments) (Terpstra, 2013)  but also due to the cumulative impact of several 
policing crises relating partly to the failure of major IT projects and to a lack of progress in 
improving collaboration between the regional forces.  Within six months of the election of a 
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new government in 2010, the Lower Chamber of the Dutch Parliament had passed the bill for 
a national police force (Terpstra, 2013).  In Scotland there was a similarly rapid process.  The 
Minister of Justice had always publicly opposed structural reform of policing but when in 
2010 the seriousness of the economic crisis for public spending in Scotland became apparent, 
a decision to explore options for reform was taken and within 18 months legislation to create 
a national police force was introduced and passed  in the Scottish Parliament force (Fyfe & 
Scott, 2013; Fyfe, 2014).  In each country, the political narrative of why reform was needed  
was similar. The regionalized structure of the police was viewed as fragmented and lacking in 
coordination, resulting in duplication of effort and an ineffective approach to major 
challenges such as organized crime and terrorism.  In both countries the public and political 
debate  triggered by the decision to create a national police force was also quite similar, 
focusing on the distribution of responsibilities between Government ministers and the Chief 
Constable, and the potentially negative consequences that a national police force might have 
for local policing.       
 
 
Contours of  reform 
 
Despite these similarities, there are important differences between the Netherlands and 
Scotland regarding the attention given to local policing within the legislation establishing the 
national police forces.  The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (hereafter the 
Scottish Police Act) sets out a clear requirement for local policing to be organised at the level 
of the 32 local authority areas (section 45) with each area having a local commander and a local 
police plan. This reflected a key Scottish Government objective that reform must 'strengthen 
the connections between services and communities' (Scott, 2013).  The Scottish Police Act 
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also sets out 'policing principles' which reinforce the importance of localism. According to 
these principles 'the main purpose of policing is to improve the safety and well-being of persons, 
localities and communities in Scotland.' The police should be 'accessible to, and engaged with, 
local communities' and the police should collaborate with other local agencies to promote 
'measures to prevent crime, harm and disorder' (section 32).  The contrast with the Netherlands  
is substantial. The Dutch Police Act 2012 (hereafter the Dutch Police Act) does not contain 
legal requirements for local policing like the Scottish Police Act. The only statutory 
requirement of the Dutch Police Act  with regard to local policing, is that there should be 'at 
least one community police officer for every 5000 inhabitants' (Section 38a). In the 
parliamentary debate about the Dutch Police Act this element was added by members of 
parliament who feared that the introduction of a national police force might have a negative 
impact on local policing and the availability of community police officers. However, the 
Dutch Police Act provides no information about the tasks of these community officers nor 
about the approach or overall aims of policing as set out in the Scottish legislation. 
 
Part of the explanation of these differences in emphasis within the two police reform acts can 
be attributed to the different approaches of each jurisdiction towards the structures of  local 
governance and accountability of policing. In Scotland before 2013 the governance of the 
eight regional police forces was based on the so-called tripartite structure comprising central 
government, local authorities and the police.  The Police Authority (consisting of elected 
members of  local councils) was the main form of local governance and it had responsibility 
for  setting the budget and representing the views of citizens.  The Police Authority would 
also appoint the local chief police officers and contribute 49% towards the costs of  policing 
(the remaining 51% coming from the Scottish Government). With the Scottish Police Act  the 
tripartite structure has been abolished along with the statutory responsibilities of local 
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government for funding the police and appointing officers.  Formal governance now only 
operates at a national level (via an unelected Scottish Police Authority)  and the 32 local 
authorities are only required to establish arrangements for the scrutiny of local policing but 
have no statutory or fiscal responsibilities.  There is however a requirement on the local police 
commander to consult the local authority in setting priorities and objectives and the 
commander must also submit an annual local policing plan to the local authority for approval 
(section 46, 48) (Scott, 2013: 138).  
 
In the Netherlands, the formal ‘management’ (in Dutch:’ beheer’) of the police (i.e. the power 
to make decisions on the resources and organization of the police) has shifted to the national 
level as a result of the Dutch Police Act  while at a local level the non-elected mayors retain  
their formal ‘authority’(‘gezag’) over the local police, i.e. the power to make decisions about 
police operations with regard to the enforcement of public order and service tasks.  As was 
already the case in the former Dutch police system, the mayor has to share authority over the 
police with the (local) public prosecutor. For that reason since the late 1960s there is legal 
requirement that the local police commander, the mayor and the public prosecutor consult 
regularly in the so-called local triangle. What is new in the Dutch Police Act 2012 is that the 
mayor has the statutory right to have a triangle meeting at the local level. The mayor and the 
public prosecutor also make agreements about local police priorities and crime fighting. The 
mayor has to account to the municipal council for the way that s/he practices the authority 
over the police. The Dutch Police Act 2012 also says that at least each four years this council 
decides on the objectives of local security that the police should concentrate on (Section 38b).  
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There is therefore an intriguing tension within the police reform legislation in each 
jurisdiction.  The Scottish Police Reform Act   requires ‘local policing’ but the institutional 
infrastructure for  local governance of the police is weak.  In the Netherlands, the  Dutch 
Police Act  does not provide a clear view on how local policing should be arranged (other 
than the number of community police officers)  but  it does retain a much stronger formal 
position for  local government (especially the mayor) in the governance of the police. These 
differences are exemplified by the way in which in Scotland the divisional police commander 
has the statutory obligation of drawing up a local policing plan while in the Netherlands it is 
the local government that constructs  an ‘integrated public safety plan’.  
 
Changes to the local governance of policing: reconfiguring local autonomy? 
 
Having set out the legislative context for reform, this and the following section focus on the 
implementation of changes to policing at a local level, focusing first on changes to local 
governance  and then on changes to the organisation and delivery of policing.  In both these 
arenas not only are there important differences between the Netherlands and Scotland but also 
between what is set out in the legislation and what is now being implemented on the ground.  
As in other areas of public policy, police reform therefore provides an interesting example of 
the emergence of an implementation ‘gap’ or ‘deficit’, a point we return to in our conclusions. 
 
The Netherlands 
As the previous section indicated, the Dutch Police Act did not fundamentally change the 
formal structures of local governance of the Dutch police. The mayor still has the power of 
‘authority’ over the local police, and is required to meet regularly with the public prosecutor 
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and the local police chief in the ‘local triangle’. The municipal council retains the power to 
call the mayor to account and  make decisions about the local public safety policy plan.  
The interview data indicates,  however, that the implementation of police reform is creating a 
more differentiated picture of local governance and accountability than could be expected 
after reading the proposals of the reform. There are some locations where little has changed 
since the start of 2013 (see also: Inspectie, 2014).  Here many of the senior officers are the 
same and the informal relations between the mayor and the local police chiefs have continued.  
This partly reflects the way in which a  conflict with the police unions about the reform has 
caused a considerable delay in the implementation process so when the interviews were 
carried out (more than one year after the reform started)  the officers in post in some locations 
were still the same as before the reform. In other locations, however, the introduction of the 
national police has led to changes in the senior management at a local level and  mayors 
perceive that their position in relation to the police has weakened considerably. A mayor of  a 
large city described  how during the first weeks of the national police he was no longer 
provided with  information about police operations as he had in the past and his complaints 
about this to the new local police chief had no impact.  It was only when he complained to the 
more senior regional police chief and threatened to inform the local media that police 
responded by providing the relevant information.   
 
These inter-personal tensions have been exacerbated by more structural issues.  In part this 
reflects concerns that a national police will place more emphasis on national priorities.  While 
most of the mayors interviewed did not feel that national priorities have yet displaced local 
priorities, some of the mayors and local police officers did mention cases where they already 
feel less attention is given to local issues (also Inspectie, 2013: 46) and they think this will 
increase as a problem in the future (Inspectie 2014).  A more immediate structural issue is the 
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contrast between  the old  regionalized police system where there was often a direct 
relationship between the mayor and the local police chief, and the new organizational 
structure where there is a disjuncture between the police organization and the local 
government. For example, several municipalities now have to share one ‘basic team’ (the  new 
organisational unit for undertaking local police tasks) and most municipalities no longer have 
their own local triangle because these are now organized at the level of the basic teams. That 
means that in some areas there are between five and seven  mayors within a local triangle 
making it difficult to address issues specific to one municipality. Although  under the Police 
Act 2012 the mayor has the statutory right to have a triangle meeting for their municipality 
alone, in practice this only happens in urgent and exceptional circumstances. One of the 
consequences of this increasing distance between mayors and local police commanders  is 
that many of the interviewed mayors feel that they no longer get relevant information from 
the police and that they are often excluded from important decisions regarding the 
development of the local police. One of the  mayors who was interviewed tried to get 
information about the future of the police station in his municipality but was told by the local 
police chief this was not a matter for the mayor: 
'A couple of times I asked them what will happen with our police station here. Are you 
already closing it? No, I was completely wrong and I did not understand it. But in fact 
I notice that there are fewer police officers here in this area than before. But you do 
not get the information. They simply do not provide the information that I in my 
position as a mayor am entitled to receive. (-) And now it proves that in fact they have 
already been working on the preparations to close the police station here. And if I, 
together with a mayor from a neighbouring municipality, ask the senior regional police 
chief about this, he blandly says that is none of your business.' (Mayor)    
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Other  mayors mentioned that they do not have information about the developments 
concerning the basic team in their area, although these may have important consequences for 
local policing and the position and availability of community police officers.   In addition, the 
study of the police inspectorate (Inspectie, 2014: 108) shows that many of the mayors fear 
that in the near future they will lose their  factual power to govern the police: 
'How can I carry out my authority over the police if I do not have the information 
anymore? The organizational structure is now such that for me as the mayor it is not 
possible to realize the authority over the police anymore.' (Mayor) 
 
In sum,  several of the mayors interviewed fear that they will no longer be able to exercise 
their authority over the local police. The shift of the management of the police to the national 
level  and the increasing standardization of police work, means that they do not have the 
room, resources and powers to ensure their authority over the police (see also Inspectie 2014: 
116). Indeed, one of the mayors feared that only after an acute crisis, such as serious disorder 
or some other disaster, would  national politicians and the public become aware of the 
consequences of this erosion of  local authority over the police.     
   
Scotland 
While the Netherlands retains a local infrastructure around governance and accountability, 
one of the most radical changes brought about by the Scottish Police Reform Act  was the 
abolition of  locally elected police authorities.   The main form of statutory governance now 
operates at the national level via the unelected Scottish Police Authority while at a local level 
the powers of locally elected councillors only extend as far as requesting information and 
reports from the local police commander and the approval of local police plans.  Police reform 
has therefore brought about a fundamental shift in the relationship between local authorities 
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and the police away from governance towards what is being referred to as ‘scrutiny and 
engagement’.   How local authorities discharge their role in scrutiny and engagement is a 
matter for them as the Scottish Police Reform Act prescribes neither structures nor processes 
and instead encourages flexibility and the need to be responsive to local conditions.  As a 
consequence, the implementation of local scrutiny arrangements has seen  local authorities 
adopt a variety of different models from scrutiny by the full council  or an existing council 
committee to more informal groupings between councillors and other local stakeholders.  
 
Although  a study  by the police inspectorate in 2013 of the development of these emerging  
local scrutiny  arrangements concluded that there was a ‘general view that these developments 
offer a real opportunity to take police …services closer to local democracy’ (HMICS, 2013), 
few local councillors appear to be as optimistic.  Their concerns were highlighted in the 
written evidence local authorities gave to the Scottish Parliament’s  Sub-Committee on 
Policing in its review of local policing arrangements.   That evidence concluded that 
‘[Elected] Members, generally, feel that they have lost meaningful local control and that there 
is an increasing centralisation agenda at play’ (COSLA, 2014).  This view was echoed by 
councillors interviewed for this study.  Several highlighted examples of how within the first 
few months of the establishment of Police Scotland, the relative powerlessness of local 
authorities had  become apparent. One example concerned the decision by Police Scotland to 
either close or significantly reduce the opening hours of public counters in local police 
stations in an attempt to meet savings targets set by Scottish Government. Local councillors 
were not only unhappy by this decision but also by the lack of communication and 
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consultation about this with the affected communities.  On hearing this decision, one local 
councillor recalled:  
‘I fell off my chair! I did not know what to say. I was not informed about 
this. For me it was a surprise. (-) How could they? I have a meeting with my 
local officer every six weeks, how is it possible that I was not informed? I 
have been a councillor now for ten years. So I decided that I should talk 
with him about these issues. What he told me was that he was not allowed to 
tell us. They were forbidden to give information about that!’ (Local 
councillor) 
 
A  second example concerns an operation carried out in Edinburgh two months after the 
creation of the national police force when about 150 police officers were involved in raids on  
saunas in the city. Although the approach to managing the sex industry in Edinburgh had long 
involved a strong partnership between the local authority and other agencies (including the 
police), no organisations in the city were informed about these police activities. As a result, 
local politicians and partner agencies were upset about what they perceived as a significant 
change of approach to policing the sex industry in the city. According to one city councillor: 
 
'...  you can say that Edinburgh always had its own policy on these sex 
saunas. We do not like them of course, but we think it is a fact of life and 
that you 'd better accept that if you don't want to have hidden prostitution 
everywhere in Edinburgh (-). You may say Edinburgh has had a more 
permissive, but also more realistic approach of this problem. Now what 
happened was that Police Scotland decided to have police raids. That really 
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caused a lot of problems here. (-) the members of the [Police Scrutiny] 
Committee, were really upset about what happened. We did not know 
anything about this. At first I thought, well, that can't be true. That must be a 
mistake. But it really was true. The police decided to do that on their own 
without any consultation' (Local councillor).  
 
These concerns were echoed by the Convenor of the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee, 
who noted that these raids provided ‘quite a dramatic example of the fears that local 
policing—which seemed to be succeeding in a different way in a different place—was being 
overridden by a national attitude that came from the top’ (Scottish Parliament Justice 
Committee on Policing, 31 October 2013, col.  266).  This view was later endorsed by one of 
Police Scotland’s most senior officers who, in a newspaper article titled ‘Edinburgh sauna 
raids show police culture clash’, observed that ‘The sauna raids in Edinburgh challenged a 
way of policing that had existed for a decade or more in terms of style and methods. The new 
policy pursued by Police Scotland challenged the approach that police had taken there which 
was about tolerance and harm minimisation’ (The Scotsman, 2014).   
 
A third example underlines this concern about a ‘one size fits all’ approach.  A  national policy 
decision that firearms officers will carry their weapons  while on routine patrol rather than 
these being kept within a locked compartment in a police vehicle until they are needed  has 
caused particular concern in the northern area of Scotland which has the lowest recorded 
crime rates in the country.  It has been opposed by local councillors, the local MSP (Member 
of the Scottish Parliament) and MP (Member of UK Parliament).  Although the SPA 
acknowledged these local concerns in a letter to the local council, SPA took the view that this 
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was an operational matter for the Chief Constable and thus an area in which they could not 
intervene. This has left local councillors feeling that they are powerless to influence decisions 
taken at a national level. According to the deputy leader of the local council: 
 
‘It is clear from the letter from the chairman of the police authority that there is 
recognition that perhaps that the Chief Constable has not been handled this 
particularly well in PR terms; and that there should have been greater 
transparency.  But it is equally apparent that nothing will change. The authority 
still accepts it is an operational matter for the Chief Constable. It is also clear 
from his letter that Sir Stephen (Chief Constable of Police Scotland) is not 
willing to entertain the idea of regional variation of the standing authority. This 
is contrary to the assurances that were given at the time the single police force 
was created. It means that even in low crime areas such as the Highlands, we 
will still have armed police turning up where it is not appropriate.  What we 
desperately need now is maximum clarification of what exactly the Chief 
Constable’s powers are and what checks and balances are in place, if any. The 
council will now be seeking that information through parliament if necessary’1 
 
Discussion 
Despite important differences between the Netherlands and Scotland in terms of the 
arrangements for the local governance of policing following reform, the perceptions of the 
outcome of the impact of establishing national police force are very similar.  In both countries 
                                                          
1 The Scotsman 8th July 2014 ‘No discussion’ on Highland armed police decision.  
http://www.scotsman.com/news/scotland/top-stories/no-discussion-on-highland-armed-police-decision-1-
3470327 
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the view of those working in local authorities is that their position in exercising governance 
and accountability in relation to the local police has been weakened. In the Netherlands where 
the formal structures of local governance have not changed, although some of the mayors feel 
that during the first year of reform not much has changed in their position, other  mayors feel 
that they have lost the information and resources needed to execute their formal authority over 
the police. In Scotland where local authorities have lost all their previous responsibilities in 
relation to local policing they feel powerless in face of decisions take at a national level. 
Viewed in terms of Clark’s (1984) models of local autonomy, the position of mayors in the 
Netherlands and local authorities in Scotland increasingly resembles a scenario where local 
political actors have little ‘initiative’ in terms of an ability to influence or regulate local 
policing, and little ‘immunity’ in terms of being able to protect local arrangements from 
decisions made at higher levels within the national police organisation.  The implementation 
of national police forces in both jurisdictions has thus resulted in a centralization of decision-
making and more weight being attributed to national priorities which have significantly 
weakened the position of local authorities. 
 
Changes to the local organisation and delivery of policing 
As the examples discussed above illustrate, the implementation of police reform has not only 
brought about changes in the governance of policing but also in the organization and delivery 
of local policing.  Drawing on interviews with local commanders and local politicians, this 
section highlights some of the more immediate changes that have occurred during the 
implementation process in both jurisdictions. 
 
The Netherlands 
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Even before Dutch Parliament had passed the new Dutch Police Act, the implementation of a 
new organisational structure had begun.  In an interesting example of implementation as a 
policy-making process (Hill, 1997), more than a year before Parliament passed the Police Act, 
a management team for the new national police force was appointed by the Minister to lay 
down the main outlines of the new police organisation in three reports published between 
2011 and 20122.   The three plans set out the hierarchical structure of the new force and the 
position and tasks of the national units and national service departments (Terpstra & Jochoms, 
2014).   A key element of the plans was the introduction of  ‘robust basic teams’ who have 
responsibility for all routine local police tasks. The basic teams can vary in size from between 
60 to 200 officers but interviews with local police chiefs show that there are important local 
differences in the implementation of this model.  In the former Rotterdam police region, for 
example,  a top-down approach was adopted with senior officers drawing up the blueprint for 
the basic team,  while in the Eastern police region, the implementation of the basic teams was 
seen as a bottom-up process in which local police officers were involved in the process. In 
terms of the legislation. the only requirement regarding local policing within the  Dutch 
Police Act concerns the number of community police officers (there must be at least one for 
every 5000 inhabitants). Some of the mayors who were interviewed welcomed this 
requirement because they assume that it will mean more community police officers will be 
working in their municipality. By contrast, many of the police officers who were interviewed 
are unhappy about this requirement because it is seen as limiting their flexibility. As a result, 
implementation strategies for reducing the impact of this requirement on the police at a local 
                                                          
2 Ontwerpplan Nationale Politie (concept), retrieved at:  http://www.sezen.nl/wp-content/uploads/Ontwerpplan-
Nationale-Politie.pdf, ; Inrichtingsplan Nationale Politie (concept), retrieved at: 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/06/27/concept-inrichtingsplan-
nationale-politie.html; Realisatieplan Nationale Politie, retrieved at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/12/07/realisatieplan-nationale-politie.html, April 2014 
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level have included interpreting ‘community police officer’ in a broad way so that other kinds 
of police officers can be included within the quota (see also Inspectie 2014: 89), adjusting the 
legal standard of 1:5000 (not as an absolute requirement, but as only an average) and 
allocating some of a community officers time to do other tasks.  
 
However, the processes of establishing basic teams and meeting quotas for community 
officers are also encountering more significant structural challenges.  A serious conflict with 
the police unions five months after the new national force began has caused a considerable 
delay in the reorganization of the police. All police officers have to apply for a new position 
in the new force. The police unions did not agree with the conditions and safeguards of this 
process, therefore they decided  not to sign the social paragraph of the reorganization plan, a 
legal prerequisite for large-scale restructuring of organizations in the Netherlands. As a 
consequence the process of implementation has effectively had to stop. 
 
This means that  14 months after the start of the Netherlands' police reform, there are 
important local differences in the state of its implementation (also Inspectie 2014). For 
example,  in some areas the introduction of the basic teams has been perceived as a way to 
make the police concentrate more on enforcement tasks and as an alternative to the 
community policing model of high police visibility and close relations between community 
officers and local residents.  However, in other places the introduction of the basic teams has 
been used as an opportunity to innovate, with the introductions of a form of community 
policing called context-driven policing (Sezen-Bascole, 2011).  Many of these local 
differences  depend on the views of regional and local police leaders about the importance of 
local policing. In the small municipality of Rhenen, for example,  the local police leadership  
decided to close the local police office located in the town hall and move the police team 
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based there to a larger city ten kilometres away where they will become part of much larger 
new basic team. The mayor fears that the availability of the police in his town will be 
seriously reduced and that the police will only operate at a distance, without much local 
information.  By contrast, in another small and rural municipality (Roerdalen), exactly the 
opposite is happening. Here the introduction of the basic teams is seen by the local police 
chiefs as an opportunity to strengthen local policing and to reverse the trend of the past twenty 
years of the police largely retreating from rural areas. Because the basic teams are now much 
larger it creates the opportunity to have a small sub-team with the members supervised by the 
local community police officer. The sub-team has its accommodation in the new town hall. 
This also implies that now there is a much closer relation between the mayor and the 
community police officer than there was before police reform. The members of the sub-team 
are responsible for all regular police tasks in the municipality, like processing citizens' reports 
of crime, patrol, service and prevention tasks, and investigation of petty crime while other 
members of the larger basic team can support them when necessary.  Given that a key 
objective of police reform was establishing the 'unity of the [police] organization'  through the 
standardization of work processes and organizational structures, these local differences  are 
quite remarkable. 
 
Scotland  
Unlike in the Netherlands, the detailed design of the new organisational structure  of the 
national force only occurred once the reform legislation had been passed and the new Chief 
Constable appointed. Given that there was less than nine months between this appointment 
and the date at which the new force would formally begin (1 April 2013), the process of 
designing and implementing the new organisational arrangements proceeded rapidly.  
Significantly, however, the Chief Constable implemented a structure for local policing that 
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differs in important respects from the arrangements set out in the original legislation. 
Although there are 32 local police areas aligned with the boundaries of local authorities each 
with a local commander as required by the Scottish Police Reform Act,  the main territorial 
and administrative unit for local policing are 14 police divisions.  In three areas the 
boundaries of these divisions are aligned with those of a single local authority but most 
divisions comprise several local authority areas and in 4 areas simply map on to the original 
regional police force boundaries.  While this structure for delivering local policing offers a 
degree of managerial efficiency (allowing the national command team to work with 14 
divisional rather than 32 area commanders), from a local authority perspective, this 
configuration creates a more complex landscape.  For the five local authorities who have 
boundaries co-terminous with the police divisions, there is a direct link with a divisional 
commander of the rank of Chief Superintendent. In the remaining 27 local authority areas, 
however, the most senior officer will typically be a Chief Inspector whose immediate line 
manager is the Chief Superintendent of the police division.  This creates a more differentiated 
landscape  within which local authorities must interact with the police from that set out in the 
original legislation. In those areas where local authority boundaries are co-terminous with the 
police division, the local commander has a higher degree of authority and autonomy to take 
decisions than in those local authorities which are not aligned with divisional boundaries. The 
picture is further complicated by the decision of the Chief Constable to require 353 
neighbourhood level policing plans (based on the administrative unit of multi-member ward 
areas) in addition to the statutory requirement that each of the 32 local authority areas have a 
policing plan.   While this could be seen as adding a further degree of localism and sending a 
potent symbolic message regarding the local orientation of the national force, it also creates 
potential for tensions between the priorities set out in the statutory local policing plans for 
each local authority area and those contained within ward level plans. 
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In addition to the configuration of organisational structure of the national force, two other 
developments have had a significant impact on the delivery of local policing.  The first 
concerns the local impact of national priorities. The Chief Constable’s  annual policing plan 
makes clear that crimes of violence are to be given the highest priority, particularly where 
these relates to rape and other forms of sexual violence. One consequence is that each local 
police division has had to establish a rape and sexual violence unit. This in turn has led to the 
displacement of other local priorities, particularly where these relate to property crime,  with 
the result that some pre-reform local initiatives, such as specialist burglary teams, have been 
abandoned. These national priorities have been reinforced by a new national performance 
management system based around a range of quantitative indicators and key performance 
targets for enforcement-led activities, such as the use of ‘stop and search’ tactics to detect and 
deter crime,  or stopping motorists who are speeding or using mobile phones. This 
enforcement-led approach very much reflects the way that the Chief Constable of Police 
Scotland delivered policing in his previous role of Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police. As 
Sir Stephen House (2013: 9-10) emphasised in a public lecture, ‘the unique selling point that 
we [the police] have is that we are an enforcement agency.’ The application of this approach 
to the rest of Scotland  (dubbed ‘Strathclydification’ or ‘Strathclydisation’ by the national 
media) is already proving controversial. This is most clearly evident in the increasing use of 
stop and search.  Since the mid-2000s, the rate of stop and search had been increasing in 
Scotland and by 2010  was nearly four times higher than in England and Wales, but this was 
largely accounted for by the use of this tactic in Strathclyde Police where over 80% of stop 
searches in Scotland were carried out (Murray, 2014).  Following the establishment of Police 
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Scotland, the use of this tactic has continued to grow as a result of specific national 
performance targets. It has been estimated that the national rate was 140 stops per 1000 
people in 2013/14 compared with 86 per 1000 in 2010 (SPA, 2014). This has meant 
substantial increases in stop and search activity in many areas of Scotland where previously 
this tactic had been used less often, with some communities seeing the number of stop and 
searches increase by over 400%  in the period April and December 2013 (SPA, 2014: 11). 
While chief officers have robustly defended the use of this tactic to fight crime, weapons and 
drugs, others are more critical and fear that on the long run stop-and-search may have 
negative consequences for the relations between the police and certain groups, may contribute 
to social conflicts and damage the image of the police (Murray, 2014).   These concerns were 
underlined by the Scottish Police Authority (2014) in its review of the policy and practice of 
stop and search. This review recommended that more attention is focused on balancing 
policing needs with the rights of individuals, making better use of analysis tools to support the 
targeting of stop and search, and improving officer training.     
 
Discussion: mind the implementation gap? 
A key lesson of implementation research is that there is typically an implementation ‘gap’ 
between the  ‘policy promises’ as set out in legislation and the ‘policy products’ that are 
established in practice  (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Ham and Hill, 1986; Hill & Hupe, 
2009; Hupe, 2014).  This reflects the way implementation is often dependent on the joint 
actions of large numbers of semi-autonomous actors, each having their own interests, agendas 
and views, that may or may not be in line with the policy mandate. The implementation 
process can therefore be very complex, highly unpredictable and full of uncertainty (O’Toole, 
2004). It may be dependent on persuasion and negotiations between different actors using 
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different resources and political strategies (Bardach, 1978: 37).There may also be tensions 
between ‘those who believe in control, planning and hierarchy on the one hand, and on the 
other those who believe in spontaneity, learning and adaptation’ (Lane, 1987: 543).  
 
The  local  implementation of the recent police reform in the Netherlands and Scotland 
exemplifies precisely these features of the implementation process.  In Scotland,  the high 
degree of autonomy of the Chief Constable over the national force means that he has been 
able to introduce a structure and style of local policing that differ in important respects from 
those envisaged by the legislation.  In terms of structure, the two tier arrangement set out in 
the Scottish Police Reform Act (linking local authority areas directly with the national level) 
has been modified by the creation of additional  layers that reduce the scope of most local 
authorities to engage directly with a single senior local commander.  In terms of style, there is 
a growing tension between the ‘policing principles’ set out in the legislation, with their 
emphasis on partnership, harm reduction and community well-being, and current policing 
practice which appears to privilege enforcement over engagement and is highly focused on 
‘crime–fighting’ rather than on prevention and community relations.  This is exemplified by 
the key performance indicators that are now used to assess local divisional commanders 
which relate almost exclusively to enforcement activity and to issues like the increasing use of 
stop and search and the arming of officers.  In the Netherlands the emerging implementation 
gap is less due to the actions of chief police officers and more the product of conflict with the 
police unions who have not only caused a considerable delay in the reform process, but also 
created more room for local diversity than originally envisaged in the proposals for a national 
force.  To the surprise of some observers (and contrary to what could be expected from the 
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original reform proposals), in  some locations in the Netherlands the new local policing 
structure seems to give some room for an innovative form of community policing, now called 
context-driven policing. It is confirmation of the more general notion that in the 
implementation of reform policy the  process about how to define and interpret ends and 
means of police reform goes on (Terpstra & Havinga, 2001). 
 
These developments in each jurisdiction also exemplify the ways in which the room created 
by reform is used for an implementation process that is highly dependent on the  actions of 
large numbers of actors, located at different political different levels and within  different 
networks (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).  Some of these actors may be policy elites based in 
central government focused on achieving particular policy objectives while others may be 
lower level actors involved in converting policy into practice.  All these actors  come into 
play within the implementation arena,  each with their own interests, views, interpretations of  
reform, resources, and strategies. In the Netherlands, for example, the police unions have 
emerged as very important actors within this implementation arena with their refusal to make 
an agreement about the new job classification and the social paragraph of the organizational 
restructuring  causing significant delays for the government in being able to achieve its 
original objectives.  By contrast in Scotland, the Chief Constable has had the power to 
implement a sweeping set of changes to the organisation and delivery of local policing with 
very little resistance from either within or outside the police organisation. This has been 
assisted by the absence of any robust governance structure around policing at a local  level 
and by delays in establishing arrangements for creating the national governance arrangements.  
Indeed, when it looked as though the process of implementation might stall at a national level 
over a dispute between the Chief Constable and the Chair of the SPA over their different 
interpretations of the legislation regarding the role of SPA in controlling the financial affairs 
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of Police Scotland,   Scottish Government  intervened on the side of the Chief Constable and 
the SPA was forced to back down.   As these examples show, the interactions between the 
actors involved implementation and particularly between policy elites and lower level actors, 
means that the implementation process will typically consist of struggles, bargaining, 
negotiations and the creation of coalitions. (cf. Lane, 1987; Hill, 1997).   
 
Concluding comments 
While it is too early to come to a definitive assessment of the implications of the two police 
reforms, the trajectory of change presented in this paper clearly stands in stark contrast to 
claims made in some jurisdictions regarding the emergence of a ‘new localism’ in policing 
(see McLaughlin, 2007; Bullock and Sindall, 2014).  Indeed, the analysis presented here helps 
to provide some insights into what the centralization of policing through the creation of 
national police forces means in practice.  This goes beyond simply the creation of new 
structures but also involves the emergence of new relationships and processes.  However, 
because police work is so dependent on local contexts and the actions of officers at street 
level, the implementation of the police reform is faced with fundamental tensions between the 
pressure to centralize and standardize, and the need for decentralization and local professional 
autonomy.  However, despite this emphasis on a new centralism, it is also important to 
recognise that this does not eliminate the possibility of local initiative or the scope for the 
process of implementation to be seen as a learning process, where decisions take early on the 
process or modified at a later stage.  In the Netherlands the new window of opportunity 
created by the police reform has been used by some of  police participants to introduce 
innovative community policing strategies, now labelled as ‘context-driven policing’. 
Similarly, in relation to the growing public criticism about the extensive use of stop and 
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search, Police Scotland have decided to pilot a new approach in one division that will place 
more emphasis on aligning this tactic with the principles of procedural justice.  In terms of 
implementation being a learning process, many of those interviewed in Scotland also thought 
that the decision by Police Scotland to carry out raids on saunas in Edinburgh without 
consulting local authorities would be handled differently in the future  and involve more 
consultation because of the reputational damage  for the police caused by these raids.  The 
decision by Police Scotland to allow some officers to carry firearms while on routine patrol is 
also to be reviewed by the police inspectorate and the SPA with a view to understanding 
better the community impact of this decision.   The introduction of police reform in both the 
Netherlands and Scotland therefore exemplifies the way in which policy implementation is a 
highly complex process in which the conversion of policy objectives into action can involve 
contested and negotiated relationships between policy elites and lower level actors, different 
interpretations of legislation, bureaucratic discretion, and on-going processes of learning 
among key decision-makers as the process of implementation unfolds. 
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